Abstract. We propose a method to exponentially speed up computation of various fingerprints, such as the ones used to compute similarity and rarity in massive data sets. Rather then maintaining the full stream of b items of a universe [u], such methods only maintain a concise fingerprint of the stream, and perform computations using the fingerprints. The computations are done approximately, and the required fingerprint size k depends on the desired accuracy and confidence δ. Our technique maintains a single bit per hash function, rather than a single integer, thus requiring a fingerprint of length k = O(
Introduction
Hashing is a key tool in processing massive data sets. Many uses of hashing in various applications require computing many hash functions in parallel. In this paper we present a technique that "ties together" many hashes in a novel way, which enables us to speed up such algorithms by an exponential factor. Our method also works for some complicated hash function such as min-wise independent families of hashes. In this paper we focus on producing an optimal similarity fingerprint using this method, but our technique is general, as it is easy to use our approach to speed up other hash intensive computations. One easy example where our technique applies is approximating the number of distinct elements from [1] . A another example, which requires a slightly stronger analysis, is computing of L p sketches [13] for 0 ≤ p ≤ 2 .
Min-wise independent families of hash functions, which we call MWIFs for short, were introduced in [16, 6] . Computations using MWIFs have been used in many algorithms for processing massive data streams. The properties of MWIFs allow maintaining concise descriptions of massive streams. These descriptions, called "fingerprints" or "sketches", allow computing properties of these streams and relations between them. Examples of such "fingerprint" computations include data summerization and subpopulation-size queries [9, 8] , greedy list intersection [14] , approximating rarity and similarity for data streams [10] , collaborative filtering fingerprints [4, 3, 2] and estimating frequency moments [1] . Another motivation for studying MWIFs is reducing the amount of randomness used by algorithms [7, 16, 6] .
Recent research reduced the amount of information stored, while accurately computing properties data streams. Such techniques improve the space complexity, but much less attention has been given to computation complexity. For example, many streaming algorithms compute huge amounts of hashes, as they apply many hashes to each element in a very long stream of elements. This leads to a high computation time, not always tractable for many applications.
Our main contribution is a method allowing an exponential speedup in computation time for constructing fingerprints of massive data streams. Our technique is general, and can speed up many processes that apply many random hashes. The heart of the method lies in using a specific family of pseudo-random hashes shown to be approximately-MWIF [12] , and for which we can quickly locate the hashes resulting in a small value of an element under the hash. Similarly to [17] we use the fact that members of the family are pairwise independent between themselves. We also extend the technique and show one can maintain just a single bit rather than the full element IDs, thus improving the fingerprint size. Independently of us [15] also considered storing few bits per hash function, but focused only on minimizing storage rather than computation time.
Preliminaries
Let H be a family of functions over the same source X and target Y , so each h ∈ H is a function h : X → Y , where Y is a completely ordered set. We say that H is min-wise independent if, when randomly choosing a function h ∈ H, for any subset C ⊆ X, any x ∈ C has an equal probability of being the minimal after applying h.
Pseudo-Random Family of Hashes
We describe the hashes we use.Given the universe of item IDs [u], consider a big prime p, such that p > u. Consider taking random coefficients for a d-degree polynomial in Z p . Let a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a d ∈ [p] be chosen uniformly at random from [p] , and the following polynomial in
We denote by F d the family of all d-degree polynomials in Z p with coefficients in Z p , and later choose members of this family uniformly at random. Indyk [12] shows that choosing a function f from F d uniformly at random results in
. We call this random construction procedure for f (x), g(x) the base random construction, and the construction of h i the composition construction. We prove properties of such hashes. We denote the probability of an event E when the hash h is constructed by choosing f, g using the base random construction and composing
Lemma 1 (Uniform Minimal Values). Let f, g be constructed using the base random construction, using
, construct f, g using the base random construction, and compose h(
There is exactly one value in r ∈ [p] such that (q + r) mod p = s. Thus, for any s ∈ [p], the probability that the coefficient of
is a polynom such that for any z ∈ Z p we have p(z) < min y∈X (p(y)), then we have P r[p(z) < min y∈X (p(y))] = 1, and otherwise P r[p(z) < min y∈X (p(y))] = 0. Lemma 2 (Pairwise Interaction). Let f, g be constructed using the base random construction, using
, and all i = j used to compose
results in two equations with two unknowns in Z p , with a single solution (a l , b l ) (where a l is the coefficient of
, construct f, g using the base random construction, and compose
3 Fingerprinting Using Pseudo-Random Hashes Several methods were suggested for building fingerprints for approximating relations between massive datasets, such as the Jackard similarity (see [6] for example). Given a universe U , where
|C1∪C2| . Many fingerprints rely on applying many hashes to each elements in the long streams. We use a the hashes of Section 2 to exponentially speed up such computations. We use pseudo-random effects in this hash, so we must relax the MWIF requirement to a pairwise independence requirement (2-wise independence).
For completeness, we briefly consider previously suggested approaches for approximating Jackard similarity [6] . Let h ∈ H be a randomly chosen function from a MWIF H. We can apply h on all elements C 1 and examine the minimal integer we get, m h 1 = arg min x∈C1 h(x). We can do the same to C 2 and examine m h 2 = arg min x∈C2 h(x). Fingerprints for estimating the Jackard similarity are based on computing the probability that
Theorem 1 (Jackard and MWIF Collision Probability). P r h∈H [m
The proof is given in [6] , and in the appendix for completeness.
Similarly, regarding a hash h from a γ-MWIF, [5, 6] shows that:
Rather than maintaining the full C i 's, previous approaches [5, 6] suggest maintaining their fingerprints. Given k hashes h 1 , . . . , h k randomly chosen from an γ-MWIF, we can maintain m . Thus, such a fingerprint requires k log u bits. To achieve an accuracy and confidence δ, such approaches require k = O(
2 ). Our basis for the fingerprint is a "block fingerprint" which allows approximating J i,j with a given accuracy and a confidence of 7 8 . This block fingerprint maintains only a single bit per hash, as opposed to previous approaches which maintain log u bits per hash. Later we show how to achieve a given accuracy with a given confidence δ, by combining several block fingerprints, and creating a full fingerprint.
To shorten the fingerprints using a single bit per hash, we use a hash mapping elements in [u] to a single bit -φ : [u] → {0, 1}, taken from a pairwise independent family (PWIF for short) of such hashes. Rather than defining m
rather than m φ i shortens the fingerprint by a factor of log u. We examine the resulting accuracy and confidence.
The purpose of the fingerprint block is to provide an approximation of J with accuracy . We use k hashes, and choose k = Achieving a Desired Confidence We combine several independent fingerprints to increase the confidence to a desired level δ. Section 3 used a fingerprint of length k to achieve a confidence of Due to Theorem 5 to make sure that |Ĵ − J| ≤ it suffices to take m > 2 ) hashes, storing a single bit per hash. 3 The accuracy γ is much stronger than the overall accuracy required of the full fingerprint, for reasons to be later examined
We discuss speeding up the fingerprint computation. Consider computing the fingerprint for a set of b items X = {x 1 , . . . , x b } where
The fingerprint is composed of m "block fingerprints", where block r is constructed using k hashes h r 1 , . . . , h r k , built using 2 · d random coefficients in Z p . The i'th location in the block is the minimal item in X under h i : m i = arg min x∈X h i (x), which is then hashed through a hash φ mapping elements in [u] to a single bit. We show how to quickly compute the block fingerprint (m 1 , . . . , m k ). A naive way to do this is applying k · b hashes to compute Once all h i (x j ) values are computed for i ∈ [k], j ∈ [b] , for each row i we check for which column j the row's minimal value occurs, and store m i = x j , as illustrated in the left of Figure 2 . Thus, computing the fingerprint requires finding the minimal value across the rows (or more precisely, the value x j for the column j where this minimal value occurs). To speed up the process, we use a method similar to the one discussed in [18] as a building block. Recall the hashes h i were defined as h i (x) = f (x) + ig(x) where f (x), g(x) are d-degree polynomials with random coefficients in Z p . Our algorithm is based on a procedure that gets a value x ∈ [u] and a threshold t, and returns all elements in (h 0 (x), h 1 (x), . . . , h k−1 (x)) which are smaller than t, as well as their locations. Formally, the method returns the index list I t = {i|h i (x) ≤ t} and the value list V t = {h i (x)|i ∈ I t } (note these are lists, so the j'th location in V t , V t [j], contains h It[j] (x)). We call this the column procedure, and denote by pr − small − loc(f (x), g(x), k, x, t) the function that returns I t , and by pr − small − val(f (x), g(x), k, x, t) the function that returns V t . We describe a certain implementation of these operations in Section 4.1. The running time of this implementation is O(log k + |I t |), rather than the naive algorithm which evaluates O(k) hashes.
Thus, this procedure quickly finds small elements across columns (where by "small" we mean smaller than t). This is illustrated on the right of Figure 2 .
Fig. 2. Finding small elements across columns rather than minimal elements across rows
Roughly speaking, our algorithm maintains a bound for the minimal value for each row, and operates by going through the columns, finding the small values in each of them, and updating the bounds for the rows where these occur.
, k, t) : If our method updates m i , p i for row i, once the procedure is done, m i indeed contains the minimal value in that row, and p i the column where this minimal value occurs, since if even a single update occurred then the row indeed contains an item that is smaller than t, so the minimal item in that row is smaller than t and an update would occur for that item. On the other hand, if all the items in a row are bigger than t, an update would not occur for that row. The running time of the column procedure is O(log k + |I t |), which is a random variable, that depends on the number of elements returned for that column, |I t |. Denote by L j the number of elements returned for column j (i.e. |I t | for column j). Since we have b columns, the running time of the block update is O(b log k)+O( b j=1 L j ). The total number of returned elements is b j=1 L j , which is the total number of elements that are smaller than t. We denote by Y t = b j=1 L j the random variable which is the number of all elements in the block that are smaller than t. The running time of our block update is thus O(b log k + Y t ).
The random variable Y t depends on t, since the smaller t is the less elements are returned and the faster the column procedure runs. On the other hand, we only update rows whose minimal value is below t, so if t is too low we have a high probability of having rows which are not updated correctly. We show that a certain compromise t value allows achieving both a good running time of the block update, with a good probability of correctly computing the values for all the rows. , where l = 80+2 log 1 (so l = O(log 1 )), the runtime of the block − update procedure is O(b log 1 + 1 2 log 1 ).
Proof. Recall that to get a γ-MWIF (for γ = 1 2 10 ) we used d = O(log 1 γ ) as the degree of the random polynoms f, g in the base random construction, used to compose the h 1 , . . . , h k hashes. Examining the constant in the work of Indyk [12] shows that the requirement is d > 80 + 2 log 1 . Denote l = 80 + 2 log 1 . Due to our choice of d we have d > l , so the hashes h 1 , . . . , h k were effectively chosen at random from an l -wise independent family. Let H be an l − wise independent family of hashes. Consider the following equation from [12] , regarding E t , the expected number of elements x ∈ X such that h(x) ≤ t (i.e. elements that are smaller than t under h chosen at random from
When computing the fingerprint for the elements in X, we know |X| 4 and denoted
Under this choice 5 of t = 12l ·p b
we have E t = tb p = 12l and using the fact that l = 80 + 2 log 1 the above lemma can be rewritten as: P r[min x∈X h(x) > t] < 6 . We obtain:
We use the following lemma, proven in the appendix: V ar(Y ) ≤ E(Y ), and using Chebychev's inequality obtain:
. To guarantee the required run time in a worst case analysis, we can drop all the 4 We use this assumption for simplicity. If we don't know |X|, we can update the threshold t online. We store all elements until we have
elements. Then we set t according to b = 2 log 1 δ 2 . We double b by 2 each time |X| > b and update t according to the new b. 5 Notice that this constant is only to bound the worst case usually in a block the maximum between the minimal values is about l moreover we can improve the running time if we drop from the sketch all the hash functions which there minimal value is to big. 6 We base our calculation on the pairwise independence of Yi,j. Notice that Yi,j is more independent when running over i. Therefor in practice the constants are smaller.
blocks which require too long to compute. This reduces our probability of success in each block from 
Computing The Minimal Elements of the Pseudo-Random Series
We give a recursive implementation of pr − small − loc(f (x), g(x), k, x, t) and pr − small − val(f (x), g(x), k, x, t), the procedures for computing V t and I t . Recall the hashes h i were defined as h i (x) = f (x) + ig(x) where f (x), g(x) are d-degree polynomials with random coefficients in Z p . Consider a given element x ∈ Z p for which we attempt to find all the values (and indices) in
, and denote a = f (x) ∈ Z p and b = g(x) ∈ Z p . Thus, we are seek all values in {a mod p, (a + b) mod p, (a + 2b) mod p, . . . , (a + (k − 1)b) mod p} smaller than t, and the indices i where they occur. Consider the series S = (s 1 , . . . , s k ) where s i = (a + ib) mod p and i = {0, 1, . . . , k − 1}. We denote the arithmetic series a + bi mod p for i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k − 1} as S(a, b, k, p), so under this notation S = S(a, b, k, p).
Given a value we can find the index where it occurs, and vice versa. To compute the value for index i, we compute (a + ib) mod p. To compute the index i where a value v occurs, we solve v = a + ib in Z p (i.e. i = Proof. Denote x = J 1,2 . The set C i ∪ C j contains three types of items: items that appear only in C i , items that appear only in C j , and items that appear in C i ∩ C j . When an item in C i ∩ C j is minimal under h, i.e., for some a ∈ C i ∩ C j we have h(a) = min x∈C1∪C2 h(x), we get that min x∈Ci h(x) = min x∈Cj h(x). On the other hand, if for some a ∈ C i ∪C j such that a / ∈ C i ∩C j we have h(a) = min x∈C1∪C2 h(x), the probability that min x∈Ci h(x) = min x∈Cj h(x) is negligible 10 . Since H is MWIF, any element in C = C i ∪ C j is equally likely to be minimal under h. However, only
The proof of Theorem 4 (Simple Estimator for Jackard With Single Bit Per Hash): P r(|Y − J| ≤ ) ≥ 7 8 . 10 Such an event requires that two different items, xi ∈ Ci and xj ∈ Cj would be mapped to the same value h * = h(xi) = h(xj), and that this value would also be the minimal value obtained when applying h to both all the items in Ci and in Cj. As discussed in [12] , the probability for this is negligible when the range of h is large enough.
Proof. Our proof uses Chebychev's inequality: P r(|X − E(X)| ≥ ) ≤ V ar(X) 2 We have:
We now bound V ar(X):
We use this to bound V ar(Y ):
Using Chebychev's inequality we get that:
Denote α = 
